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How does the U.S. government nance scal shocks?
By Antje Berndt and Hanno Lustig and S evin Yeltekin
We develop a method for identifying and quantifying the scal
channels that help nance government spending shocks. We dene
scal shocks as surprises in defense spending and show that they
are more precisely identied when defense stock data are used in
addition to aggregate macroeconomic data. Our results show that
in the postwar period, about 9% of the U.S. government's unantic-
ipated spending needs were nanced by a reduction in the market
value of debt and more than 70% by an increase in primary sur-
pluses. Additionally, we nd that long-term debt is more eective
at absorbing scal risk than short-term debt.
JEL: C5; E4; E6; G1; H6
Keywords: Fiscal shocks; scal adjustment; defense spending; bond
returns; debt maturity
In this paper we explore the dynamic adjustment of the U.S. government's s-
cal balances to expenditure shocks. We identify the dierent scal adjustment
channels that help stabilize the U.S. government's balances and develop a method
for quantifying the use of each channel in the postwar era. To do so, we make use
of the government's intertemporal budget constraint. The government's budget
constraint dictates that surprise increases in spending must be nanced through
either an increase in primary surpluses or a reduction in returns on the govern-
ment's bond portfolio. We refer to the rst channel of adjustment as the surplus
channel and the second as the debt valuation channel.
The surplus channel operates through an increase in contemporaneous and ex-
pected future surplus growth when the news about higher expenditures are re-
vealed whereas the debt valuation channel operates through a decline in contem-
poraneous and expected future debt returns. In normative models of scal policy,
adjustments through the debt valuation channel are referred to as \scal insur-
ance". Standard models in this literature feature a benevolent government that
minimizes the excess burden of taxation by varying its debt returns. The extent
to which it can do this is determined by the asset market structure it faces. In
complete-market models, a decline in debt returns absorbs the surprise increase
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in spending needs, allowing the government to maintain a constant excess burden
of taxation. In incomplete-market models, however, interstate nancing of scal
shocks, hence scal insurance through bond markets, is limited.1
Several authors have used the implications of these normative models and the
empirical behavior of tax rates and debt levels to assess the incompleteness of
debt markets.2 The empirical evidence uncovered and documented in these pa-
pers suggests that debt markets are incomplete and hence do not provide full
insurance against scal shocks. However, the prior literature does not quantify
how much scal insurance the government does achieve through bond markets
in practice.3 Our main contribution is to develop a framework that not only
identies scal adjustment channels, but more importantly, provides quantitative
estimates of scal insurance. This is accomplished by using the intertemporal
budget constraint of the government only, and hence without taking an a priori
stance on market incompleteness or government preferences.
To quantify the degree of scal adjustment through each channel, we proceed
in three steps. The rst step involves a particular log-linearization of the govern-
ment's budget constraint which permits a tractable decomposition of the response
to scal shocks into news about current and future surplus growth and news about
current and future debt returns. Motivated by Valerie A. Ramey (2011)'s discus-
sion that defense spending accounts for almost all of the volatility of government
spending, we identify scal shocks as news to current and future defense spending
growth.
In the second step, we carefully construct holding returns on government debt
and estimate unstructured VARs to obtain empirical measures of the news vari-
ables. There is potentially an important caveat associated with using only aggre-
gate macroeconomic data to estimate these news variables, particularly the news
to current and future defense spending growth. As documented by Ramey (2011),
the problem is the possible failure of aggregate data to respond to defense spend-
ing surprises in a timely manner. Our second contribution is to propose a novel
approach that addresses this issue within the VAR framework. Specically, we
include information embedded in the stock returns of companies in the defense
industry as additional explanatory variables. Our logic is straightforward. In
so far as defense companies' prots and dividends are tied to defense spending,
defense stock return variables should respond contemporaneously to news about
future defense spending growth. The results from a VAR augmented with defense
stock returns conrm our intuition: defense spending growth is indeed predicted
more precisely compared to a VAR that includes only aggregate macroeconomic
data.
In the third step, we utilize the constructed news variables to estimate the scal
1See Section I.B for references and a more thorough discussion of normative models.
2See, inter alia, Robert J. Barro (1979), Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Helen Rey (2007), Andrew
Scott (2007) and Albert Marcet and Andrew Scott (2009).
3One exception is Elisa Faraglia, Albert Marcet and Andrew Scott (2008), who report covariances
between decit shocks and value of debt for a select group of OECD countries between 1970 and 2000.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 3
adjustment betas that describe the response of expected surpluses and of expected
returns to scal shocks. The budget constraint decomposition we use maps these
scal adjustment betas directly into the fraction of scal shocks nanced through
the surplus and debt valuation channels. In the postwar era, most of the scal
adjustment following scal shocks is provided by the surplus channel. Depending
on the particular VAR lag specication, the fraction of scal risk absorbed by
the surplus channel is between 72% and 94%. The amount of scal risk absorbed
through the debt valuation channel is about 9%, and is robust to dierent VAR
lag lengths used. This estimate for the debt valuation channel is associated with
a scal adjustment beta of about -0.35, which implies that innovations to real
returns on government debt decrease by roughly 35 basis points when innovations
to defense spending growth increase by one percent. These results indicate that
the U.S. government has achieved a limited, but non-negligible degree of scal
insurance through the bond markets since 1946.
The debt valuation channel has two components: (i) return variations that
are contemporaneous with scal news and the focus of much of the normative
literature on scal policy, and (ii) variations in future returns following scal news.
We nd that only about 2%, roughly 20% of the scal adjustment through the debt
valuation channel, is achieved through variation in current returns. Variations in
future bonds returns, on the other hand, have absorbed over 7% of the scal risk
in the postwar era. This latter result does not have an analogue in the normative
literature, but it is a robust feature of the data.
The debt valuation channel estimates re
ect the response of value weighted
returns on the government debt portfolio to scal shocks. This leads to the ques-
tion of whether debt of dierent maturities is equally eective at delivering scal
insurance. The third contribution of our paper is to provide empirical evidence
that long-term debt, mainly through adjustments to future returns, is more ef-
fective in absorbing scal shocks than short-term debt.4 Using the augmented
VAR, we show that the fraction of scal risk absorbed by debt of 1-year maturity
is about 7.5%, whereas this fraction is more than double of that amount at 17%
for debt of 20-year maturity. The total amount of scal insurance depends on the
actual maturity composition of government debt. The value weighted maturity
of government debt in the postwar period is 3.1 years, delivering an overall scal
insurance of about 9% as previously stated. While our framework is not designed
to provide a policy recommendation on the maturity structure of government
debt, the relationship between debt maturity and scal insurance we uncover is
relevant for models of optimal debt management.
4In the normative scal literature, two papers display the use of long-term debt to absorb scal
shocks. One is Hanno Lustig, Christopher Sleet and Sevin Yeltekin (2008), who show that the long-term
debt helps the government smooth distortions from costly unanticipated in
ation in a dynamic model of
optimal scal and monetary policy with nominal rigidities, and nominal non-contingent debt of various
maturities. The other is Goerge M. Angeletos (2002), who argues that if the maturity structure of public
debt is carefully chosen ex ante, the ex post variation in the market value of outstanding long-term debt
may oset the contemporaneous variation in the level of scal expenditures.4 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I log-linearizes and decomposes the
budget constraint, and formally denes scal shocks and our scal adjustment
channels. Section II describes the data and reports the empirical results from a
benchmark VAR. Section III introduces the VAR model augmented with defense
stock variables, presents the associated results and provides a variety of robustness
checks. In Section IV, we take a closer look at the composition of government debt
and identify the maturities that are more eective in delivering scal insurance.
Section V concludes.
I. Government Budget Constraint and Fiscal Adjustment
In this section we explore the implications of the government's intertemporal
budget constraint and identify the scal adjustment channels that help nance
expenditure shocks. The dynamic period-by-period version of the government's
budget constraint is given by:
Bt+1 = Rb
t+1 (Bt   St);
where Bt denotes the time-t real market value of government debt outstanding
at the beginning of the period. St denotes the federal government's real primary
surplus. It is equal to receipts Tt, inclusive of seignorage revenue, less expenditures
Gt. Rb
t+1 denotes the gross real return paid on the government's bond portfolio
between t and t + 1. This equation can be re-arranged to yield the following
expression for the growth rate of government debt as a function of the return on












Our goal is to measure the impact of news about current and future spending
on the budget constraint. In other words, to what extent is this impact oset
by contemporaneous and subsequent declines in the market value of outstand-
ing debt and increases in future primary surpluses? To accomplish this task, we
rst separate the various components of the budget constraint by log-linearizing
Equation (1). The log-linearization of the government's budget constraint fol-
lows a similar procedure to the log-linearization of the household budget con-
straint in John Y. Campbell (1993) and the country external budget constraint
of Gourinchas and Rey (2007). Campbell's focus is asset pricing, whereas Gour-
inchas and Rey's is international adjustment to large trade or asset imbalances.
Our main focus on the other hand is on the channels that stabilize the U.S. scal
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A. Log-linearizing the budget constraint
Campbell's linearization of the household budget constraint treats labor income
as the return on human capital and, hence, part of the return on the household's
overall portfolio. The constraint is then re-expressed as a function of household
wealth (inclusive of human capital) and consumption, both of which are taken
to be positive. In contrast, we treat government income from taxation as a part
of the surplus 
ow rather than as a return on a government asset. The fact
that the surplus may be either positive or negative creates diculties for the log-
linearization of (1). We circumvent these issues by expanding around both the
average log receipts to debt and log spending to debt ratios and then constructing
a weighted log primary surplus.
The log-linearization procedure is valid under the following assumptions re-
garding spending, receipt and surplus to debt ratios. First, we assume that for
all t, the market value of outstanding government debt, Bt, is positive and larger
than the primary surplus, St. Second, we assume that the logarithm of the re-
ceipts to debt ratio, log(Tt=Bt), and the logarithm of the spending to debt ratio,
log(Gt=Bt), are stationary around their average values b and gb, respectively.
Lastly, we suppose that exp(b)   exp(gb) lies between 0 and 1.
We have veried that our assumptions are supported by the data for our sam-
ple period of 1946.I to 2008.III. Figure 1 displays the time series of log(Tt=Bt)
and log(Gt=Bt).5 Optimizing the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) proposed
by Gideon Schwarz (1978), we nd an optimal lag length of one for both time
series.6 The associated Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics reveal that the
unit-root hypothesis can be rejected for both log(Tt=Bt) and for log(Gt=Bt) at
the 5% level.7
Throughout, our notational convention is to use lower cases to denote log vari-
ables and  to denote a dierence, so that bt = logBt, bt+1 = logBt+1 logBt,
and so on. Let nst denote the weighted log primary surplus:
(2) nst = t   ggt:
The weights are derived from the log-linearization of Equation (1) detailed in








5Details of the scal data used to construct T and G can be found in the appendix.
6The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), based on Hirotsugu Akaike (1974), penalizes the number
of parameters less severely and as a result suggests that including two (log(Tt=Bt)) or ve (log(Gt=Bt))
lags is optimal. In any case, the AIC test statistics were fairly 
at for one to ten lags, for both time
series.
7The ADF(0) test statistic is -3.0879 for log(Tt=Bt) and -3.1182 for log(Gt=Bt), each with a 5%
critical value of -2.8418. See Said E. Said and David A. Dickey (1984) for details.6 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR











Figure 1. Government Receipts and Spending
Note: This plot shows the logarithm of the receipts to debt ratio, log(Tt=Bt), and the logarithm of the
spending to debt ratio, log(Gt=Bt). The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
where b = exp(b) and gb = exp(gb). In Appendix A, we also show that under
the above assumptions, and ignoring unimportant constants, the log-linearization
yields the following approximation for the law of motion for debt:








where sb = b   gb and  = (1   sb) 2 (0;1).
Equation (4) implies the rst-order dierence equation:
(5) nst   bt = rb
t+1   nst+1 + (nst+1   bt+1):
Solving (5) forward and imposing the tail condition limj!1 Etj(nst+j  bt+j) =
0, we obtain the following expression for the weighted log surplus to debt ratio,
nst   bt:
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The expression in (6) implies that if the log surplus to debt ratio 
uctuates, it
has to be due to either a change in expected future returns on outstanding debt,
or a change in expected surplus growth. The log surplus to debt ratio reveals
deviations from the long-run relationship between surpluses and debt. If it is
negative, the surplus is small relative to the market value of debt. In this case,
we expect low future returns on government debt or high future surplus growth.
If the log surplus to debt ratio is positive, we anticipate high future returns on
debt or low future surplus growth.
In a related paper, Chryssi Giannitsarou and Andrew Scott (2006), by follow-
ing Gourinchas and Rey (2007), derive a log-linearized budget constraint similar
to Equation (6) to assess scal sustainability in a number of countries.8 Gi-
annitsarou and Scott use a variance-covariance decomposition of a weighted log
decit to total government liabilities ratio to examine the channels through which
governments achieve scal sustainability. Our focus on the other hand, is on ad-
justments to exogenous scal shocks. Temporal variations in nst   bt may or
may not be anticipated and hence cannot be used to measure shocks. Therefore,
we do not base our estimation strategy on Equation (6), but transform it into a
relationship between innovations to the variables in the budget constraint. This
allows us to directly quantify scal insurance.
To express Equation (6) in terms of innovations, we compute the dierence
between expectations at time t+1 in (6) minus those at time t, and move bt+1  
Etbt+1 = rb
t+1 Etrb
t+1 to the right-hand side. This yields the following expression:








Since nst+1   Etnst+1 = (Et+1   Et)nst+1, we have:








In what follows, we refer to (Et+1 Et)Xt+1 as innovations, news, shocks to Xt+1
for any process X. Equation (7) then states that a positive shock to the (weighted
log) surplus growth must correspond either to a positive shock to returns on
government debt or to a negative shock to surplus growth. As a corollary, we can
infer news about surplus growth from news about returns on government debt.
Ultimately, we are interested in nding out how much the government uses
each of the two channels, lower bond returns or higher future surpluses, to -
nance its unanticipated spending needs. Therefore, we decompose Equation (7)
further to isolate the component of the government's budget that we identify with
8A recent paper related to Giannitsarou and Scott (2006) is Hess Chung and Eric M. Leeper (2009),
which imposes a version of Equation (6) on an identied VAR to study its implications for scal nancing.8 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
expenditure shocks.
B. Fiscal shocks and scal adjustment channels
The presence of active scal policy and its associated implementation lags com-
plicate the timing and extraction of news to government expenditures from aggre-
gate government spending data. Ramey (2011) advocates using defense spending
data to identify scal shocks. She argues that 
uctuations in defense spending
account for almost all of the 
uctuations in total government spending relative
to its trend and that non-defense spending accounts for most of the trend in gov-
ernment spending. Ramey also shows evidence that suggests most non-defense
spending is done by state and local governments rather than the federal gov-
ernment, undermining the ability of empirical estimations relying on aggregate
expenditure data to capture unanticipated changes to government spending.
Motivated by Ramey, we dene exogenous shocks to government spending,
i.e. scal shocks, as innovations to defense spending growth. We do not argue
that all defense spending is exogenous, but rather that innovations to defense
spending are a measure of shocks to government expenditures. To identify these
scal shocks, we rst separate government spending into defense and non-defense
components. We then re-derive the log-linearization of the budget constraint in
Appendix A by expanding log(1 + St=Bt) in (A2) around three components: the
average log receipt to debt ratio, b, the average log non-defense spending to
debt ratio, gb
ndef
, and the average log defense to debt ratio, gb
def
. We can then
redene nst as:






























































t+1 denotes the growth in defense spending. Substituting the last equa-
tion into (7), and rearranging produces the following relation between news about











































Equation (10) is central to our analysis and guides our empirical strategy. It
identies two main channels for stabilizing the government's scal balances fol-
lowing a defense spending shock. It implies that a positive shock to defense
expenditure growth has to coincide with one of two things: a negative shock to
returns on debt, and/or a positive shock to non-defense surplus growth. We refer
to the rst of these adjustments as the debt valuation channel, and the second as
the surplus channel. To quantify the relative importance of each of these channels,
we rst develop a framework to construct these news variables and then measure
the empirical relationship between them.
The normative scal theory refers to the debt valuation channel, specically
the current return component of the debt valuation channel, as scal insurance.
Standard models in the normative literature feature a benevolent government that
minimizes the welfare losses arising from variation in marginal tax rates over time
and states. If the tax system is suciently constrained, then the government will
wish to smooth inter-state marginal tax rates and the excess burden of taxation
by varying the return it pays on its debt.9 The extent to which it can do this is
determined by the asset market structure it faces.
In complete market models, there are no restrictions on the government's ability
to insure against shocks through return variations.10 At the other extreme, if the
government can trade only one period real non-contingent debt, then optimal
policy entails intertemporal rather than interstate smoothing of taxes and the
excess burden.11 Intermediate cases in which scal insurance is possible, but
costly, deliver intermediate results. In these scenarios, the government optimally
9If the government has access to lump sum taxation, then Ricardian Equivalence implies that it need
make no recourse to bond markets. If it can tax private assets without inducing any contemporaneous
distortion, then asset taxation can substitute for variations in debt returns. Lastly, if the government can

exibly adjust both consumption and income tax rates in response to shocks, then again debt is redundant
as a scal insurance mechanism (see Isabel H. Correia, Juan P. Nicolini and Pedro Teles (2008)). On the
other hand, if the tax system is sticky or if the government is constrained to adjust income tax rates in
the aftermath of shocks, then debt's essential role as a scal insurance instrument is reinstated.
10Scott (2007) shows that when markets are complete, the government maintains the excess burden of
taxation|the shadow value of the future primary surplus stream|at a constant level. Labor tax rates
still vary to the extent that the compensated labor supply elasticity varies. However, these variations
are typically dampened relative to an incomplete-market setting.
11See Barro (1979) and S. Rao Aiyagari, Albert Marcet, Thomas J. Sargent and Juha Seppala (2002).10 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
responds to shocks with a mixture of interstate and intertemporal smoothing of
taxes and the excess burden.12
Several contributors, beginning with Barro (1979), have used normative models
of the sort described above to assess scal policy empirically. Early analysis found
evidence of persistence in tax rates consistent with incomplete-market models.13
More recent work by Scott (2007) and Marcet and Scott (2009) has obtained and
empirically assessed the implications of complete and incomplete markets optimal
policy models. These two papers provide further evidence of persistence in debt
levels and tax rates relative to allocations, suggestive of incomplete-market models
and hence limited access to scal insurance through bond markets. We, on the
other hand, do not take any ex-ante stance on the degree of market completeness
or on the preferences of the government. That is, we do not distinguish between
the government's inability or unwillingness to engage in scal insurance. Our
framework relies only on the intertemporal budget constraint of the government,
which is consistent with all dynamic scal models. Our goal is to develop a
method for quantifying scal adjustments to scal shocks, and apply this method
to postwar U.S. data. More specic theoretical mechanisms can be introduced
into our framework and tested as restrictions. However, they will have to be
consistent with the two channels of adjustment and their relative quantitative
importance. Our ndings can provide useful information to guide the theoretical
scal management literature.
We now describe how we use Equation (10) to quantify the debt valuation and
surplus adjustments to scal shocks.
C. Quantifying scal adjustments
The debt valuation channel operates through a decline in contemporaneous
and expected future returns on the government's debt portfolio when news about
higher defense spending growth is revealed, whereas the surplus channel operates
through an increase in contemporaneous and expected future non-defense surplus
growth. When the government is fully insured against scal shocks, the negative
shock to expected returns completely osets the surprise increase in expected
defense spending growth. If scal shocks are not nanced through the debt valu-
ation channel fully, then the government will have to run larger surpluses now or
in the future. Before we quantify the relative importance of these two channels,
we introduce the following pieces of notation. We denote news about current
and future defense spending growth, news about current and future returns to
12One example is Lustig, Sleet and Yeltekin (2008). There, a government trades nominal non-
contingent debt of various maturities. Costly contemporaneous or expected future in
ations allow it
to hedge scal shocks. Another example is Christopher Sleet (2004) who requires scal policy to satisfy
incentive compatibility restrictions.
13See, for example, Chaipat Sahasakul (1986), David S. Bizer and Steven N. Durlauf (1990) and
Gregory D. Hess (1993). However, as Henning Bohn (1998) and Scott (2007) point out, the unit root
tests used in this literature have low power against the alternative of optimal policy in an environment
with complete markets and persistent shocks.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 11
government debt, and news about current and future non-defense surplus growth
by

















With these pieces of notation in place, we can also formally dene scal insurance
in our framework to be a negative covariance between innovations to current and






To assess how much of the defense spending shocks is absorbed by debt returns
and by future surpluses, we regress both the news about returns and the news







1 ht+1(gdef) + "ns
t+1: (12)
If r
1 is equal to minus one, the total decline in innovations to current and
future debt returns is one percent when the innovations to current and future
defense expenditure growth rises by one percent. According to Equation (10),
we can map this beta directly into a fraction of total scal risk nanced by the
debt valuation channel. If r
1=
def
g is minus one, the government is obviously
fully scally insured and does not require any adjustment through the surplus
channel. Analogously, if ns
1 =
def
g is one, the surplus channel fully absorbs the
scal shocks.
II. Estimating the News Variables
This section provides details on the data and presents our rst set of estimation
results. We start by setting up an unrestricted VAR to construct innovations to
defense spending growth, to government debt returns and to non-defense surplus
growth. The state vector of the VAR consists of variables that help estimate the
terms in Equation (10), including real holding returns on government debt, non-
defense surplus growth and defense spending growth. We use quarterly data that12 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
covers the postwar period from 1946.I to 2008.III. We then estimate the fraction
of scal shocks nanced by each adjustment channel using the news variables
constructed from the VAR.
A. Government debt returns
Real holding returns on government debt, rb
t, are central to our analysis and
need to be carefully constructed, so that their temporal variation is preserved.
Therefore, we do not rely on aggregate scal data as in Chung and Leeper (2009),
nor on average price and maturity data as in Giannitsarou and Scott (2006) and
Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008). Instead we employ a multi-step procedure
that computes the holding returns for each maturity in order to obtain a value
weighted return on total government debt. We start our procedure by employing
the Charles R. Nelson and Andrew F. Siegel (1987) technique to extract the
time-t nominal zero-coupon yield curve using CRSP Treasury bill and coupon-
bond price data.14 This enables us to compute nominal discount rates, which are
converted to real terms using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Let Pk
t denote
the real price of a synthetic zero-coupon government bond that matures at time
t + k, for k = 1;:::;120, where k represents quarters. The time-t real holding





t 1. We obtain rb
t by forming the value weighted average of the
quarterly real holding returns rk















t 1 is the time-(t   1) weight for maturity k.
In the denition of wk
t 1, sk
t denotes the number of time-(t + k) dollars the
government has promised to deliver as of time t. The series sk
t is determined
from the CRSP Monthly Treasury database going back to 1960 and from the
Treasury Bulletins, the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times for the
years 1946 to 1960. These les contain monthly data on the maturity and face
value of outstanding publicly held debt, plus coupon-rate data on virtually all
negotiable direct obligations of the U.S. Treasury. We unbundle each outstanding
bond at time t into its principal and coupon payments, and then construct sk
t by
accumulating, across all bonds, the notional amounts due in k periods.15 A similar
accounting technique is used in George J. Hall and Thomas J. Sargent (1997) for
14To facilitate the yield-curve extraction, we clean the price data so that it contains only straight
bonds with a maturity of at least one year plus T-bills with 30-days or longer until maturity. We also
remove all bonds with 1.5% coupon rates, as they have been documented to contain large spurious errors.
For details, see pg. 27 of the CRSP Monthly Treasury U.S. Database Guide.
15Note that CRSP does not report the face value of Treasury bills held by the public, and that these
data are obtained from table FD-5 of the monthly Treasury Bulletins.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 13
computing the government's real cost of borrowing.16 Figure 2 shows the times
series of rb
t for our sample period of 1946.I to 2008.III. The average return is close
to zero at 0.34%, but the series displays considerable variation with a standard
deviation of 2.34%.


















Figure 2. Real Holding Returns on Government Debt
Note: This plot shows the time series of value weighted real holding returns on the government debt
portfolio, rb
t. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
We make the assumption that there are no relevant innovations to slow-moving
trends for any of the three variables in Equation (10). This allows us to remove
slow-moving trend components, if they exist, of debt returns, non-defense surplus
growth and defense spending growth in order to estimate their innovations more
precisely. For government debt returns, we do not nd any signicant trend
component. We do, however, observe a sudden upward shift in the average level
of returns around 1981.17 We do not view this increase as part of a slow moving
trend but rather as an innovation to government debt returns, which we would
16The Treasury reports the interest cost of total government debt, calculated by summing up all the
principal and coupon payments the government has promised to deliver at t + k as of time t. The
Treasury's methodology makes no distinction between coupon payments and principal payments, and
hence mismeasures the cost of funds.
17Between 1946 and 1980, real holding returns rb
t 
uctuate around zero, but starting in 1981, the
average return level increases to 1.2%.14 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
like to capture. It is possible that this shift in the average returns is related to
Volcker disin
ation starting in the early 1980's. We therefore include in
ation as
a state variable in our VAR analysis, but do not detrend rb
t.
B. Non-defense surplus and defense spending growth
To construct ns
ndef




g from the sample
averages of the logs of receipts to debt, non-defense spending to debt and defense
spending to debt ratios. For our sample period of 1946.I to 2008.III, these weights
are  = 10:877, 
ndef
g = 6:064 and 
def
g = 3:813. Receipts include current federal
tax revenues, contributions for social insurance, income receipts on other assets,
current transfer receipts and seignorage revenue. Non-defense spending includes
all federal expenditures excluding national defense spending, gdef, and excluding
interest on debt. Most data are obtained from NIPA tables. The monetary
base for calculating the seignorage revenue is obtained from the St. Louis FRED.
The computation of the seignorage revenue and the details of the scal data are
explained further in Appendix B. The debt in question, Bt, measures the time-t












t using a one-sided Robert J. Hodrick and Ed-
ward C. Prescott (1997) (HP) lter. The one-sided HP lter uses only past values
to estimate the trend and hence preserves the temporal ordering of data. In de-
trending the two series, we use a smoothing factor of 8330, which tends to cut
out frequencies corresponding to periods above 15 years. We choose 15 years as
our benchmark because that is the average time between consecutive increases
in defense spending, as documented by Ramey (2011) and displayed in Figure 3.
The gure includes real defense spending and the Ramey dates for our sample
period. The latter are (1941.I,) 1950.III, 1965.I, 1980.I, and 2001.III.18
C. Benchmark VAR results
We rst estimate a benchmark VAR that includes only aggregate macroeco-
nomic data. The state vector zt for this VAR includes real holding returns on
government debt, non-defense surplus growth, defense spending growth, as well as
two additional variables known to predict real bond returns: quarterly in
ation,
t, computed as the quarterly rate of change of the CPI and the quarterly John H.
18In Section III.D, we provide results from a variety of cycles, including the standard cycle length of
9.9 years, employed by the business cycle literature.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 15











Figure 3. Real Defense Spending
Note: This plot shows the time series of real defense spending from 1939 to 2008, as well as the Ramey
(2011) defense shock dates (vertical lines).
















t are the detrended nsndef and gdef series, respec-
tively. All variables, except in
ation and CP, are de
ated using the CPI. We
demean all the variables and impose a rst-order structure on the VAR:
zt+1 = Azt + "t+1:
Table 1 reports the GMM estimates with their t-statistics.19 Our results show
that this simple specication does reasonably well in predicting the returns on
government debt. The R2 on the return equation is 13.5%, with signicant coef-
cients for CP and in
ation. Our results also indicate that, as one would expect,
none of the variables are signicant in predicting the non-defense surplus growth
19We provide robustness checks on the VAR lag length in Section III.D.16 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
or in predicting defense spending growth.








t -0.0999 -0.3784 -0.0019 1.9802 -0.0051 0.1353
(-0.9935) (-2.1090) (-0.7394) (4.5360) (-0.2569)
t 0.0220 0.5195 0.0019 -0.1504 -0.0031 0.2541
(0.6618) (6.1524) (1.2353) (-0.8226) (-0.2749)

ns;ndef
t 0.0557 4.1801 0.0848 -8.3343 -0.3712 0.0196
(0.0261) (0.7321) (0.5727) (-0.6256) (-0.6302)
CPt 0.0073 0.0221 -0.0002 0.9154 0.0002 0.8763
(0.8683) (2.0545) (-1.3978) (33.4974) (0.2663)

g;def
t -0.0276 0.8138 0.0061 -2.7649 0.0873 0.1260
(-0.1906) (1.6801) (0.5760) (-1.5209) (0.4327)
Note: This table reports the results of the benchmark VAR estimation. The benchmark VAR includes
ve variables, one lag and uses quarterly data. T-statistics for the GMM estimates are reported in
parentheses. We use the Newey-West variance-covariance matrix with four lags as the weighting matrix.
The last column reports the R-squared. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
We calculate the news about current and future defense spending growth from
the benchmark VAR estimates as:
ht+1(gdef) = e5(I   A) 1"t+1;
where I is the identity matrix, ei represents a row vector of dimension ve with
one in the i'th position and zero everywhere else, and "t+1 represent the VAR




gb ) equal to its postwar sample value
of 0.9855. We obtain news about current and future government debt returns and
news about current and future non-defense surplus growth by:
ht+1(rb) = e1(I   A) 1"t+1;
ht+1(nsndef) = e3(I   A) 1"t+1:
D. Benchmark scal adjustment results
This section reports our empirical scal adjustment results for the benchmark
VAR model.
20If Equation (10) were to hold exactly as an equality, constructing all three of the news variables from
the same VAR would not be possible because the system would be overidentied. However, Equation (10)
is a rst-order approximation which allows us to compute the news variables as dened here. We
have nevertheless veried our scal adjustment results by constructing the relevant news variables from
separate VARs that avoid this overidentication problem. These results, which conrm our original
estimates, are available from the authors upon request.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 17
Empirical correlations. | Table 2 reports the correlations between the news
variables on its o diagonals, and the standard deviations of these variables on
the diagonals. We make the following observations. First, news about current
and future defense spending growth are strongly negatively correlated with news
about current and future returns on government debt ( 0:72), providing strong
evidence of scal insurance in the postwar period. Second, innovations to current
and future defense spending growth have twice the volatility of government debt
returns. Third, innovations to current and future defense spending growth are
positively correlated with innovations to non-defense surplus growth, providing
evidence for scal adjustment through the surplus channel. The news to non-
defense surplus growth is very volatile, with a standard deviation roughly seven
times that of news to defense spending growth and 15 times that of news to
government debt returns. Finally, there is a moderate negative correlation ( 0:42)
between news to debt returns and news to non-defense surplus growth, indicating
that the interaction between the surplus and the debt valuation channels increases
the total amount of scal shocks absorbed, rather than counteracting either of
the channels.




ht+1(nsndef) -0.42 0.40 0.58
Note: This table reports the standard deviations (diagonals) and the correlations (o-diagonals) of the
news variables constructed from the benchmark VAR. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
Fiscal adjustment betas. | Table 3 reports the betas from the scal adjustment
regressions and maps these betas into the fraction of scal shocks absorbed by
the debt valuation and surplus channels. The scal adjustment beta for the debt
valuation channel (Line 3) is -0.37, implying that a one-percent shock to defense
spending growth induces, on average, a 37 basis points unexpected drop in returns
on outstanding public debt. This suggests that a sizable degree of scal risk was
born by bond holders in the postwar era: 9.61% of defense expenditure shocks
were absorbed by an unanticipated decline in current and future bond returns.
Over this period, innovations to current and future defense spending growth have
accounted for 52% of the total variation in innovations to current and future
holding returns on the federal government's outstanding portfolio of bonds.
The scal adjustment beta for the surplus channel (Line 4) is 2.80, implying
that a one-percent shock to defense spending growth induces, on average, a 2.80
percentage point unexpected increase in current and future non-defense surplus
growth. It suggests that the surplus channel has absorbed a signicant portion,18 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
Table 3|Fiscal Adjustment Results for Benchmark VAR
0 1 R2 Fraction
hc(rb) 0.0003 -0.0690 0.0671 0.0181
(0.2179) (-2.2625)
hf(rb) 0.0017 -0.2973 0.5620 0.0780
(1.0098) (-5.2064)
h(rb) 0.0020 -0.3663 0.5200 0.0961
(0.8841) (-4.8947)
h(nsndef) -0.0001 2.7962 0.1586 0.7334
(-0.0035) (5.2112)




and ht+1(nsndef) on ht+1(gdef), as described in Equations (11) and (12). The rst two columns show
the intercept and the scal adjustment beta, with their t-statistics in parentheses. The third column
reports the R-squared, and the nal column shows the fraction of scal shocks nanced by each channel.
Innovations are computed from the benchmark VAR. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
73.34%, of scal shocks in the postwar era. Over this period, innovations to
current and future defense spending growth have accounted for 16% of the total
variation in innovations to current and future surplus growth. These results
imply that over the sample period, adjustments in bond returns and non-defense
surpluses together have nanced about 83% of scal shocks.21
The scal adjustment estimates reported in Table 3 are the results of a two-step
procedure{in the rst step we estimate the VAR and construct the news variables,
and in the second step we run scal adjustment regressions that treat these news
variables as observed data. Although such multi-step procedures yield consistent
point estimates and are common practice in the empirical macro and macro-
nance literatures, we do provide additional statistics that take into account
parameter uncertainty to verify the robustness of our benchmark scal adjustment
estimates. We do so by computing a Monte Carlo distribution of the betas that
takes the benchmark VAR coecient matrix A and simulates 10,000 realizations
fA(z)g from its asymptotic distribution using the estimated mean and covariance
matrix. For each realization A(z), we compute the innovation variables and re-




1 . We then
simulate 1,000 realizations from the asymptotic distribution of r
1 and ns
1 , using
their respective estimated means and standard deviations to obtain an overall
Monte Carlo distribution for each beta. The rst, second and third quartile of
the 
r;(z)
1 distribution are -0.41, -0.30 and -0.20, translating into 10.84%, 7.84%
and 5.20% of scal risk absorbed. For the surplus channel, the rst, second
and third quartile of the 
ns;(z)
1 distribution are 1.51, 2.74 and 4.30, resulting in






g can dier from one since Equation (10) is an approximation
derived from the intertemporal budget constraint, and hence need not hold with equality. We do not
impose any restrictions on the size of the betas, nevertheless our empirical estimates show that their sum
is reasonably close to one. This is conrmed by the robustness checks in the next subsection.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 19
39.53%, 71.97% and 112.77% of scal risk absorbed. Our reported point estimates
for r
1 and ns
1 are well within these intervals.
Table 3 also reports scal adjustment betas for two components of the debt
valuation channel: adjustments to current returns and adjustments to future
returns. The current scal adjustment beta is obtained by regressing the rst
term in ht+1(rb), which is hc
t+1(rb) = (Et+1   Et)rb
t+1, on ht+1(gdef). According
to our estimates, this beta, although statistically signicant, is only -0.069. It
implies that between 1946 and 2008, only 1.81% of defense spending shocks were
absorbed by a surprise decline in contemporaneous debt returns. Most of the
adjustment to debt returns after a scal shock has come in the form of a decline
in future debt returns. The future scal adjustment beta, obtained by regressing
h
f
t+1(rb) = (Et+1   Et)
P1
j=1 jrb
t+j+1, on ht+1(gdef), is -0.30, which corresponds
to 7.80% of the scal shocks nanced. The normative literature on scal policy
emphasizes the role of contemporaneous adjustment to returns in providing scal
insurance. Our results show that adjustments to future returns play an important
role and help absorb more of the scal shocks. This suggests an additional scal
adjustment channel for normative models to explore.
III. Defense Shocks and Defense Stocks
For our measures of the debt valuation and surplus channels to be precise, it is
important that we estimate innovations to defense spending growth well. These
innovations represent any changes to the information set expectations are condi-
tioned on. These changes stem from previously expected but eventually unrealized
movements in defense spending growth, and/or from previously unanticipated yet
realized movements in defense spending growth. Two factors potentially compli-
cate the extraction of such forecasts from macroeconomic data. First, agents
may learn about political and/or military events driving future defense spending
growth in advance of this growth occurring or aecting other aggregate vari-
ables. Second, macroeconomic data may dilute the new information on defense
spending growth during aggregation. Thus, VARs relying exclusively on such ag-
gregate data may fail to identify the true date of the shock.22 We propose a novel
VAR specication that addresses these issues. More specically, we augment our
benchmark VAR specication with information embedded in the stock returns of
companies in the defense industry. Our logic is straightforward. In so far as de-
fense companies' prots and dividends are tied to defense spending, defense stock
return variables should immediately capture any new information about defense
spending growth. If our intuition is correct, then defense stock returns will help
identify scal shocks more precisely.23
22See Ramey (2011) for a discussion of the causes and implications of mis-timing shocks when using
the VAR approach.
23Ramey (2011) and Alan J. Auerbach and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (2010) investigate the predictive
power of government spending forecasts provided by the Fed's Greenbook and the Survey of Professional
Forecasters for VAR-implied spending shocks and nd evidence that these forecasts do indeed have20 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
A. Defense stocks: Excess returns
First, we consider augmenting the benchmark VAR with excess returns on
defense stocks, r
def
t , relative to the market return, rm
t , and their price to dividend
ratios as additional forecasting variables. Defense stocks are identied as rms
with SIC codes between 3760-3769 (Guided missiles and space vehicles), 3795-
3795 (Tanks and tank components) and 3480-3489 (Ordnance & accessories).
This is identical to the Fama-French denition of the \Guns" industry in their 49
industry portfolios.24 We use CRSP cum-dividend returns for all defense stocks
to compute quarterly value weighted portfolio returns for the defense industry.
In addition, we also compute price dividend ratios at the portfolio level, using
CRSP data on dividend cash amount (data item DIVAMT). The market return
is measured as the return on the value weighted CRSP market portfolio. The
inclusion of these additional variables is motivated by the John Y. Campbell and
Robert J. Shiller (1988) expression for the dividend to price ratio:








where d is the log dividend, p is the log price, rs is the holding return and d is
the dividend growth rate of a stock. All variables are in real terms. Campbell and
Shiller argue that a high log dividend to price ratio implies high expected future
holding returns or low expected future dividend growth. For our case, this means
that excess returns and dividend to price ratios on defense stocks may contain
information about current and future dividend growth in the defense industry
and hence information on current and future defense spending growth. The state



















Table 4 reports the estimation results using the VAR specication (13). Our
results indicate that the excess returns on defense stocks help predict future de-
fense spending growth; the coecient of excess returns in the defense spending
equation is positive and signicant. This provides empirical evidence that defense
stock returns do indeed contain new information about future defense spending
predictive power. They suggest including these forecasts as additional explanatory variables in the VAR.
We have veried that these forecasts do not have any predictive power for our defense spending shocks
largely because by extracting deviations from trend, g;def, from gdef prior to the VAR analysis, we
remove these forecastable components from defense spending growth.
24For details, see Kenneth French's online data library.
25A preliminary analysis of the VAR augmented with these two variables revealed that the dividend
to price ratio did not contribute to or alter any of our results. Therefore we omit it from our subsequent
estimations and report results from the VAR augmented only with excess returns on defense stocks.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 21
growth. The variation in defense spending growth is explained better compared
to our benchmark VAR: the R2 improves to 13.5%. Additionally, (13) proves
to be a slightly better specication for explaining the variation in real holding
returns on government debt|the R2 moves up to 14.2%.










t -0.1100 -0.3874 -0.0018 1.9822 -0.0039 0.0213 0.1416
(-1.1188) (-2.1251) (-0.7148) (4.4558) (-0.1893) (1.3103)
t 0.0248 0.5220 0.0019 -0.1509 -0.0035 -0.0060 0.2563
(0.7289) (6.0505) (1.1931) (-0.8042) (-0.3017) (-0.6843)

ns;ndef
t -0.1391 4.0050 0.0855 -8.2952 -0.3476 0.4101 0.0249
(-0.0656) (0.6784) (0.5684) (-0.6141) (-0.5756) (1.1291)
CPt 0.0072 0.0220 -0.0002 0.9154 0.0002 0.0002 0.8763
(0.8425) (1.9985) (-1.3566) (32.6842) (0.2749) (0.2376)

g;def
t -0.0541 0.7900 0.0062 -2.7595 0.0905 0.0558 0.1348
(-0.3655) (1.6001) (0.5830) (-1.4908) (0.4399) (2.0732)
r
def;excess
t -0.2368 -0.5145 -0.0003 2.0267 0.1312 0.0565 0.0266
(-0.6912) (-0.7083) (-0.0220) (1.4655) (2.6914) (0.7673)
Note: This table reports the results of the augmented VAR estimation. The augmented VAR includes the
ve variables from the benchmark VAR plus the excess returns on the Fama and French \Guns" portfolio,
rdef;excess. It has one lag and uses quarterly data. T-statistics for the GMM estimates are reported in
parentheses. We use the Newey-West variance-covariance matrix with four lags as the weighting matrix.
The last column reports the R-squared. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
Table 5 reports the scal adjustment betas and the fraction of scal risk ab-
sorbed through the debt valuation and the surplus channels, using the innovations
estimated by our augmented model. All of the estimated beta coecients are sig-
nicant at the ve percent level and quantitatively very close to our estimates
from the benchmark model. The debt valuation beta is -0.36, implying that a
one percent increase in innovations to defense spending growth leads to a 36 basis
points decrease in innovations to returns and hence to 9.54% of scal shocks ab-
sorbed through the debt valuation channel. Of that, only 1.84 percentage points
are nanced by a drop in current bond returns and the remaining 7.70 percentage
points by a decline in future bond returns. The surplus beta is 2.81. It implies
that 73.68% of the scal risk were absorbed by the surplus channel in the postwar
years.
As in the benchmark case, we also compute the Monte Carlo distribution of
the betas reported in Table 5. The rst, second and third quartile of the 
r;(z)
1
distribution are -0.41, -0.29, and -0.20 and translating into 10.79%, 7.73% and
5.13% of scal risk absorbed. For the surplus channel, the rst, second and third
quartile of the 
ns;(z)
1 distribution are 1.53, 2.79 and 4.39, resulting in 40.14%,
73.29% and 115.05% of scal risk absorbed. Our reported point estimates for r
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Table 5|Fiscal Adjustment Results for Augmented VAR: Excess Returns on Defense Stocks
0 1 R2 Fraction
hc(rb) 0.0003 -0.0702 0.0704 0.0184
(0.2351) (-2.3066)
hf(rb) 0.0018 -0.2934 0.5480 0.0770
(1.0169) (-5.1858)
h(rb) 0.0021 -0.3636 0.5158 0.0954
(0.9090) (-4.9286)
h(nsndef) 0.0002 2.8089 0.1604 0.7368
(0.0046) (5.3221)




and ht+1(nsndef) on ht+1(gdef), as described in Equations (11) and (12). The rst two columns show
the intercept and the scal adjustment beta, with their t-statistics in parentheses. The third column
reports the R-squared, and the nal column shows the fraction of scal shocks nanced by each channel.
Innovations are computed from the augmented VAR in Table 4. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
and ns
1 are well within these intervals.
B. Defense stocks: Abnormal returns
The excess returns used in the VAR specication (13), r
def;excess
t , measure move-
ments in defense returns in excess of overall market returns. They may, however,
still be correlated with the market return or other systematic risk factors that
aect stock returns. We explore the extent to which the industry-specic compo-
nent of defense stock returns helps predict defense spending growth. Therefore,
we replace r
def;excess
t with abnormal returns that control for the known systematic
stock market factors.
Abnormal returns on defense stocks are constructed by regressing the dierence
between the returns, r
def
t , and the three-month riskfree rate, rRF
t , on the following
four factors: the excess return on the market portfolio, MKT, the Eugene F. Fama
and Kenneth R. French (1993) size and book-to-market factors, SMB and HML,
and the Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman (1993) momentum factor,
UMD. Specically, we estimate abnormal returns on defense stocks using rolling
regressions on moving windows of three years. That is, at time t we only use
information from the last three years, and hence exclude observations that are





t =  + MKTMKTt + SMBSMBt + HMLHMLt
+ UMDUMDt + "
def
t : (14)
26As an alternative, one could use all prior information to estimate abnormal returns as of time t,
but this would imply putting less and less weight on recent observations. A moving window of xed size
assigns equal weight to the last three years.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 23
The model is estimated using quarterly data. We refer to the residuals in regres-
sion (14) as the abnormal defense stock returns, and denote them by r
def;abn
t . The













Table 6 reports our estimation results using the alternative augmented VAR
specication (15). The variation in defense spending growth explained moves
up from our benchmark estimate of 12:6% to 15:4%. A one standard devia-
tion increase in abnormal returns increases future defense spending growth by
0.88%, while a one standard deviation increase in excess returns results in a
smaller increase of 0.49%. This is computed from multiplying the sample stan-
dard deviations for abnormal returns (5.15%) and excess returns (8.84%) with
their respective coecient estimates. In Table 6, the coecient associated with
abnormal returns in the defense spending equation is positive and signicant at
the ten percent level. We interpret it as providing additional empirical evidence
that defense stock returns do indeed contain new information about future defense
spending growth. Once again, the augmented model proves to be a slightly better
specication for explaining the variation in real holding returns on government
debt|the R2 is 14.2%. Table 7 shows that the fraction of scal risk absorbed
through the debt valuation and the surplus channels remain virtually unchanged
at 9.40% and 72.15%, respectively.










t -0.0963 -0.3604 -0.0014 1.9695 -0.0064 0.0380 0.1421
(-0.9465) (-1.9834) (-0.5538) (4.3969) (-0.3057) (1.2780)
t 0.0210 0.5143 0.0018 -0.1473 -0.0027 -0.0110 0.2566
(0.6055) (6.0028) (1.1241) (-0.7954) (-0.2350) (-0.6824)

ns;ndef
t 0.0487 4.1453 0.0839 -8.3137 -0.3686 -0.0737 0.0197
(0.0221) (0.7249) (0.5356) (-0.6048) (-0.6021) (-0.1027)
CPt 0.0073 0.0222 -0.0002 0.9153 0.0002 0.0003 0.8763
(0.8498) (1.9988) (-1.3200) (32.4777) (0.2428) (0.1768)

g;def
t -0.0114 0.8944 0.0081 -2.8125 0.0815 0.1706 0.1540
(-0.0801) (1.8818) (0.8119) (-1.5296) (0.4100) (1.9671)
r
def;abn
t -0.2935 -0.1915 0.0004 1.0532 0.1178 0.0288 0.0580
(-1.8407) (-0.4259) (0.0554) (1.2770) (4.1135) (0.3958)
Note: This table reports the results of the augmented VAR estimation. The augmented VAR includes
the ve variables from the benchmark VAR plus the abnormal returns on the Fama and French \Guns"
portfolio, rdef;abn. It has one lag and uses quarterly data. T-statistics for the GMM estimates are re-
ported in parentheses. We use the Newey-West variance-covariance matrix with four lags as the weighting
matrix. The last column reports the R-squared. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.24 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
Table 7|Fiscal Adjustment Results for Augmented VAR: Abnormal Returns on Defense
Stocks
0 1 R2 Fraction
hc(rb) 0.0003 -0.0736 0.0793 0.0193
(0.2390) (-2.4640)
hf(rb) 0.0017 -0.2846 0.5329 0.0746
(0.9969) (-5.1066)
h(rb) 0.0020 -0.3582 0.5205 0.0940
(0.9077) (-4.9918)
h(nsndef) -0.0003 2.7509 0.1588 0.7215
(-0.0079) (5.6460)




and ht+1(nsndef) on ht+1(gdef), as described in Equations (11) and (12). The rst two columns show
the intercept and the scal adjustment beta, with their t-statistics in parentheses. The third column
reports the R-squared, and the nal column shows the fraction of scal shocks nanced by each channel.
Innovations are computed from the augmented VAR in Table 6. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
The Monte Carlo distributions for the betas reported in Table 7 are as follows.
The rst, second and third quartile of the 
r;(z)
1 distribution are -0.40, -0.29 and
-0.19, translating into 10.59%, 7.61% and 5.08% of scal risk absorbed. For the
surplus channel, the rst, second and third quartile of the 
ns;(z)
1 distribution
are 1.46, 2.70 and 4.27, resulting in 38.39%, 70.69% and 118.90% of scal risk
absorbed. Once again, our reported point estimates for r
1 and ns
1 are well within
these intervals.
C. The surplus channel: Receipts vs. non-defense spending
Our empirical results show that the surplus channel has played a predominant
role in absorbing scal risk in the U.S. postwar era. An interesting question is
how much of this absorption can be attributed to innovations in receipts and how
much of it to innovations in non-defense spending. To answer this question, we
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where  and gndef are the growth rates of receipts and non-defense spending,
respectively.
To estimate the innovations to receipt growth and non-defense spending growth,
we modify our augmented VAR by replacing nsndef with  and gndef. The new

























t g. We then estimate a rst-order VAR to con-
struct the innovations to current and future receipt growth, ht+1(), and the in-
novations to current and future non-defense spending growth, ht+1(gndef). These
news variables are subsequently used in our scal adjustment regressions and the
results are reported in Table 8. The debt valuation channel beta is now about
 0:35 for both excess and abnormal defense stock return cases. This corresponds
to 9.1-9.2% of the shocks nanced, with adjustments to future returns again con-
stituting a larger part, 7.49% for excess returns and 7.24% for abnormal returns.
The scal adjustment beta that measures the response of innovations to receipt
growth to innovations to defense spending growth is positive and highly signif-
icant, with a value of 0:14 for both excess and abnormal returns cases. This
suggests that about 39% of the innovations to defense spending growth are ab-
sorbed by current and future receipt growth. The scal adjustment betas for
the non-defense spending is negative and highly signicant with values of  0:24
(excess returns) and  0:23 (abnormal returns). These translate into to 37.90%
(excess returns) and 36.57% (abnormal returns) of the scal risk absorbed by
non-defense spending.27
The results above also shed some light on why using total government spending,
as opposed to defense spending, in assessing scal shocks and scal insurance can
be problematic. If one were to observe an unanticipated change in total spending,
it would not be clear what the source of the shock is: defense or possibly non-
defense. In our framework, the non-defense part of government spending is itself a
scal adjustment channel for defense spending shocks. Because of this endogeneity
problem, we do not use total spending to identify scal shocks.
D. Robustness checks
Having shown that the inclusion of defense stock returns improves the t of our
model, we now proceed to perform robustness checks on the augmented VAR. In
particular, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the detrending param-
eter, and to the VAR lag length. The tables report results from both the VAR
27These fractions were calculated by dividing the relevant betas with ( =
def
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Table 8|Fiscal Adjustment Results for Augmented VAR: Receipts vs. Non-defense Spending
Excess Returns Abnormal Returns
0 1 R2 Fraction 0 1 R2 Fraction
hc(rb) 0.0003 -0.0656 0.0630 0.0172 0.0003 -0.0690 0.0717 0.0181
(0.2204) (-2.1873) (0.2245) (-2.3362)
hf(rb) 0.0017 -0.2856 0.5379 0.0749 0.0017 -0.2761 0.5204 0.0724
(1.0247) ( -5.2397) (1.0024) (-5.1492)
h(rb) 0.0020 -0.3512 0.4986 0.0921 0.0020 -0.3451 0.5011 0.0905
(0.9041) (-4.8601) (-0.9023) (-4.8999)
h() -0.0000 0.1382 0.1090 0.3942 -0.0001 0.1383 0.1121 0.3945
(-0.0178) (3.3465) (-0.0393) (3.3762)
h(gndef) -0.0001 -0.2383 0.1395 0.3790 -0.0001 -0.2299 0.1348 0.3657
(-0.0262) (-3.9979) (-0.0257) (-4.1415)




as well as ht+1() and ht+1(gndef) on ht+1(gdef). The left panel shows the results with innovations
computed from the VAR augmented with excess returns on defense stocks, and the right panel reports
the results for the VAR augmented with abnormal returns. In each panel, the rst two columns show the
intercept and the scal adjustment beta, with their t-statistics in parentheses. The third column reports
the R-squared, and the nal column shows the fraction of scal shocks nanced by each channel. The
sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
augmented with excess returns and with abnormal returns on defense stocks, but
for brevity we discuss only the latter in the text. The results for excess returns
are qualitatively identical and quantitatively very close to those for abnormal
returns.
Detrending. | The scal adjustment estimates reported in Tables 5 and 7 are
sensitive to the smoothing parameter we use in our HP lter. Our benchmark
smoothing factor is 8330, corresponding to 15-year cycles. In Table 9, we report
scal adjustment betas and the fraction of scal risk absorbed by the debt valu-
ation and surplus channels for a variety of smoothing parameters corresponding
to shorter and longer cycles, for the augmented VAR specications. Our ndings
suggest that as the cycle length increases, the fraction of scal shocks nanced by
the debt valuation channel decreases, while the opposite is true for the surplus
channel. The intuition for these results is as follows. As the length of the trend
cycle increases, the volatility of ltered defense spending growth rises. Hence the
volatility of defense spending news increases relative to that of bond return news.
This in turn leads to a decrease in the scal adjustment beta.
For the surplus channel, the trend cycle choice aects both the defense spending
and the non-defense surplus growth. In particular, as the cycle length increases,
the HP lter converges to a linear lter, leaving almost all of the volatility in
defense spending growth and non-defense surplus growth in the ltered data. If
these two series have nonlinear trend components that are correlated, a very high
HP smoothing factor will not lter them out. As a result, these trend components,VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 27
Table 9|Fiscal Adjustment Betas for Augmented VAR for a Variety of HP Smoothing Pa-
rameters
Excess Returns Abnormal Returns
HP cycle 1 R2 Fraction 1 R2 Fraction
9.9-year* r
1 -0.4290 0.4887 0.1125 -0.4210 0.4871 0.1104
(-4.2704) (-4.2539)
ns
1 2.1450 0.0804 0.5626 2.1007 0.0792 0.5510
(4.9594) (5.1619)
15-year r
1 -0.3636 0.5158 0.0954 -0.3582 0.5205 0.0940
(-4.9286) (-4.9918)
ns
1 2.8089 0.1604 0.7368 2.7509 0.1588 0.7215
(5.3221) (5.6460)
20-year r
1 -0.3079 0.5594 0.0808 -0.3061 0.5698 0.0803
(-5.8604) (-5.9820)
ns
1 3.3832 0.2812 0.8874 3.3279 0.2783 0.8729
(7.5580) (7.9734)
30-year r
1 -0.2463 0.5818 0.0646 -0.2465 0.5958 0.0647
(-6.7762) (-6.9505)
ns
1 3.9004 0.4430 1.0231 3.8605 0.4401 1.0126
(12.3670) (13.0463)
50-year r
1 -0.2186 0.5906 0.0573 -0.2189 0.6045 0.0574
(-7.2490) (-7.4353)
ns
1 4.1504 0.5261 1.0886 4.1199 0.5240 1.0806
(16.2031) (17.1316)
Note: This table reports the results from regressing ht+1(rb) and ht+1(nsndef) on ht+1(gdef), as de-
scribed in Equations (11) and (12). The left panel shows the results with innovations computed from
the VAR augmented with excess returns on defense stocks, and the right panel reports the results for
the VAR augmented with abnormal returns. In each panel, the rst column shows the scal adjustment
betas, with their t-statistics in parentheses. The second column reports the R-squared, and the nal col-
umn shows the fraction of scal shocks nanced by each channel. We report results for several smoothing
parameters for the HP lter. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
*This cycle is actually 9.93 years, corresponding to a HP lter smoothing factor of 1600, the smoothing
factor used in business cycle analysis.
which can be anticipated (such as the increases in surpluses to reduce debt and
decreases in defense spending following the end of WWII), will be retained in these
two series. This induces a higher correlation between the news variables which
in turn leads to higher surplus channel betas. For our benchmark cycle length of
15 years, nonlinear trend components are removed whereas extreme cycle lengths
such as 50 years fail to do this. In any case, these robustness checks indicate that
regardless of the cycle length, the U.S. government has achieved some degree of
scal insurance through the bond markets during the postwar era.
Lag length. | The scal adjustment results reported in the earlier sections are
obtained for a rst-order VAR. We choose a rst-order VAR so that the number
of parameters to be estimated relative to the size of the sample is not too large.28 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
As a robustness check, we do, however, perform standard lag length tests that
compare the VAR(1) and VAR(2) specications. The test results are displayed in
Table 10 and show that the BIC supports our choice of using one lag. The AIC
penalizes the number of parameters less severely, and as a result suggests that a
lag length of two is better than one. In this section, we investigate if any of our
scal adjustment results are sensitive to the lag choice.
Table 10|AIC and BIC Test Statistics for Augmented VAR
Lags Excess Returns Abnormal Returns
AIC BIC AIC BIC
1 -42.52 -42.02 -43.67 -43.16
2 -42.88 -41.87 -44.02 -43.00
Note: The left panel of this table reports the AIC and BIC test statistics for one and two lags in the
VAR augmented with excess returns on defense stocks, and the right panel reports these statistics for
the VAR augmented with abnormal returns. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III. We include data from
1945.IV for VAR(2) to keep the number of observations in the estimations constant.
We nd that our estimates for the debt valuation channel are robust to changing
the lag length from one to two. With VAR(1), the debt valuation channel absorbs
9.40% (abnormal returns) of the scal risk. With VAR(2), this number is only
slightly lower 8.97%. The relative contribution of the current and future returns to
total scal insurance stays virtually the same for both lag length specications.28
The debt valuation channel estimates for dierent HP smoothing parameters are
also robust to moving from one to two lags. As the cycle length increases from
9.9 years to 50 years, total scal insurance moves from above 11% to under 6%
for both lag lengths.
We do, however, nd that the estimates for the fraction of scal risk absorbed
through the surplus channel are indeed sensitive to the lag length. This estimate
is 72.15% when obtained from the augmented VAR(1) and 94.13% when two lags
are used. To further explore where this change is coming from, we decompose the
surplus channel into adjustments that stem from non-defense spending growth
and adjustments from receipt growth. We nd that the amount of scal risk ab-
sorbed by non-defense spending growth changes little. It decreases from 36.57%
for VAR(1) to 33.03% for VAR(2). The amount of scal risk absorbed by receipt
growth, on the other hand, changes more signicantly. It increases from 39.45%
for VAR(1) to 69.20% for VAR(2). While the VAR(2) specication (available in
the online appendix) delivers a signicantly more precise estimate of the receipt
growth innovations by incorporating the delayed response of receipt growth to
changes in defense spending growth, it does so at the expense of additional pa-
rameters. These additional parameters may lead to overtting in sample; the
AIC and BIC test statistics are inconclusive in determining whether VAR(1) or
28The scal insurance estimates obtained from the benchmark VAR are similarly robust to changing
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VAR(2) represents a better specication.
To summarize, government receipt growth is the only scal adjustment channel
that is sensitive to the lag length. The sensitivity of the surplus channel to the lag
length stems from this changing response of its receipt component. It is important
to emphasize, however, that the scal insurance results, i.e. the debt valuation
channel estimates, are robust across VAR(1) and VAR(2) specications. The full
set of VAR(2) results can be found in the online appendix.
IV. Debt Maturity and Fiscal Insurance
The previous sections documented that in the postwar era, the U.S. government
nanced part of its surprise spending needs through the bond markets. The nor-
mative scal theory proposes two ways to deliver scal insurance in the absence
of real state-contingent debt. One is through surprise increases in in
ation in the
presence of nominal non-contingent debt (e.g., Henning Bohn (1988)), the other
is by a careful choice of the maturity structure when only real non-contingent
debt is available (e.g., Angeletos (2002)). The latter suggests that the composi-
tion of the government's debt portfolio plays an important role in the degree of
nancing through the debt valuation channel.29 In this section, we take a closer
look at the composition of government debt and identify the maturities that are
more eective in delivering scal insurance. We begin by showing some summary
statistics. Table 11 displays the average quarterly real holding return and its
standard deviation for bonds of dierent maturities.
Table 11|Real Bond Holding Returns by Maturity
Maturity 1 5 10 15 20
Mean (%) 0:30 0:43 0:48 0:46 0:38
Std dev (%) (1:52) (3:58) (5:74) (9:78) (18:05)
Note: This table reports the average quarterly real holding returns (in percentage terms) on bonds of
dierent maturities (in years). Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Zero-coupon yield curves
are constructed from CRSP data. The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
Table 11 shows that real holding returns on long-term debt are signicantly
more volatile than returns on short-term debt. The higher volatility of long-term
debt returns has led to arguments for shortening the maturity structure, both in
the normative tax literature and in other related work. John Y. Campbell (1995)
argues that a cost-minimizing government should respond to a steeply sloped
nominal yield curve by shortening the maturity structure since high yield spreads
tend to predict high expected bond returns in the future. Robert J. Barro (1997)
emphasizes tax smoothing considerations and calls for shortening the maturity
29In
ation is included in our VAR state vector. Hence our scal insurance estimates represent adjust-
ments to real returns after controlling for in
ation.30 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
structure when the in
ation process becomes more volatile and persistent to help
governments reduce their risk exposure and better smooth taxes.
While our framework is not designed to provide a policy recommendation on
the maturity structure of government debt, it can be used to uncover some styl-
ized facts about the relationship between debt maturity and scal insurance. In
particular, it allows us to quantitatively assess the eectiveness of dierent matu-
rities of debt in nancing scal shocks. We proceed by modifying our augmented
VAR to include the real holding returns on zero-coupon bonds of k-year maturity,
rk





t+1; for k = 1;5;10;15;20:






















For each maturity k, we re-estimate Equation (16) and compute the news about
current and future government returns, ht+1(rk), by
ht+1(rk) = e7(I   Ak) 1"k
t+1;
where e7 is now a row vector of dimension seven. As before, we then regress
the news variable ht+1(rk) on innovations to current and future defense spending
growth, ht+1(gdef), for each k. The resulting scal adjustment beta estimates,

r;k
1 , are reported in Table 12.
The top panel shows the scal adjustment betas on, and the fraction of scal
shocks absorbed by, current and future returns on debt with maturities of 1,
5, 10, 15 and 20 years. All of the estimated betas are signicantly negative at
the ve percent level. The beta for 20-year debt, -0.66, is more than double of
the beta for 1-year debt, -0.29. Correspondingly, the fraction of scal shocks
nanced increases with maturity, from 7.49% to 17.22%. The sizable increase in
the estimated betas suggests that long-term debt is more eective in absorbing
scal shocks than short-term debt. However, the decline in the associated t-
statistics reported in the Table 12 prevents us from rejecting the null of constant
betas across maturities.
In earlier results (see Tables 5 and 7), we document that the scal adjustment
beta for the debt valuation channel is more precisely estimated for future returns
than for current returns. This suggests that future returns may be more suitable
for nding a signicant link between maturity of debt and absorption of scal
risk. We therefore estimate the betas using only innovations to future returns and
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Table 12|Fiscal Adjustment Betas for Augmented VAR for Each Maturity
Excess Returns Abnormal Returns
Mat 0 
r;k




1 0.0016 -0.2903 0.5660 0.0762 0.0016 -0.2857 0.5683 0.0749
(0.9619) (-5.6387) (0.96411) (-5.7426)
5 0.0024 -0.4171 0.4176 0.1094 0.0024 -0.4124 0.4261 0.1082
(0.7945) (-4.4024) (0.7961) (-4.4595)
10 0.0030 -0.4839 0.2907 0.1269 0.0030 -0.4800 0.3000 0.1259
(0.7096) (-3.4204) (0.7088) (-3.4672)
15 0.0034 -0.5552 0.1814 0.1456 0.0034 -0.5502 0.1855 0.1443
(0.5400) (-2.6656) (0.53417) (-2.6944)
20 0.0038 -0.6644 0.0958 0.1743 0.0037 -0.6563 0.0964 0.1722
(0.3405) (-2.0408) (0.3324) (-2.0473)
hf(rb) hf(rb)
1 0.0013 -0.2138 0.5631 0.0561 0.0012 -0.2075 0.5466 0.0544
(1.0187) (-5.2921) (0.9984) (-5.2240)
5 0.0021 -0.3433 0.5606 0.0900 0.0020 -0.3311 0.5392 0.0869
(1.0126) (-5.7269) (0.9842) (-5.5982)
10 0.0029 -0.4689 0.5112 0.1230 0.0028 -0.45133 0.4911 0.1184
(0.9993) (-5.1305) (0.9704) (-5.0221)
15 0.0034 -0.5571 0.4929 0.1409 0.0033 -0.5182 0.4727 0.1359
(0.9816) (-5.2674) (0.9523) (-5.1660)
20 0.0030 -0.4778 0.4464 0.1253 0.0029 -0.4579 0.4201 0.1201
(0.9228) (-5.5869) (0.8932) (-5.3650)
hc(rb) hc(rb)
1 0.0003 -0.0765 0.2072 0.0201 0.0003 -0.0782 0.2227 0.0205
(0.4024) (-4.3019) (0.4092) (-4.5561)
5 0.0003 -0.0738 0.0324 0.0193 0.003 -0.0812 0.0405 0.0213
(0.1461) (-1.3483) (0.1539) (-1.5254)
10 0.0001 -0.0150 0.0005 0.0039 0.0001 -0.0286 0.0019 0.0075
(0.0335) (-0.1713) (0.0431) (-0.3347)
15 0.0001 -0.0183 0.0002 0.0048 0.0001 -0.0320 0.0008 0.0084
(0.0229) (-0.1190) (0.0254) (-0.2142)
20 0.0008 -0.1865 0.0077 0.0489 0.0007 -0.1985 0.0089 0.0521
(0.0702) (-0.6378) (0.0685) (-0.6906)
Note: The top panel of this table reports the results from regressing ht+1(rk) on ht+1(gdef), maturity
by maturity (in years). The rst two columns show the intercept and the beta, with their t-statistics
in parentheses. The third and fourth columns report the R-squared and the fraction of scal shocks
nanced. The middle and bottom panels report similar results for innovations to future returns and
to current returns. Innovations are computed from the VAR augmented with excess returns on defense
stocks (left panel) or abnormal returns on defense stocks (right panel), and with rk
t , k = 1;5;10;15;20.
The sample period is 1946.I-2008.III.
are signicantly negative and, as anticipated, they are more precisely estimated
compared to the betas reported in the top panel. With the condence intervals
used in this paper, the null hypothesis of constant betas across maturities would
be rejected.
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is more eective in absorbing scal shocks than short-term debt. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the rst empirical documentation of the role of long-term
debt as an eective scal insurance instrument for the government. The relation-
ship between debt maturity and scal insurance that we uncover has important
implications for modeling optimal debt management. In particular, our results
can help mitigate concerns raised by Campbell (1995) and Barro (1997) about
the costs of using long-term debt and support the ndings of Lustig, Sleet and
Yeltekin (2008). The latter analyze the structure of optimal debt management
in an environment with non-contingent nominal debt of various maturities. They
show that when costly contemporaneous or expected future in
ations allow the
government to hedge scal shocks, optimal debt management calls for issuing
long-term debt only. In their setting, the volatility of long-term debt returns,
which we report in Table 11, is deliberate and managed so as to hedge the scal
risk the government faces. The risk premium on this debt resembles an insur-
ance premium paid by the government; it provides a motive for lengthening the
maturity structure.
We also report the scal adjustment betas using innovations to current returns
for each maturity in the bottom panel of Table 12. These betas are generally not
signicant, with one exception: the beta for 1-year debt. It absorbs 2.05% of the
total 7.49% scal insurance provided by debt of 1-year maturity.
Lastly, we verify the robustness of these maturity results for our augmented
VAR with two lags. The amount of scal insurance estimated using the two lag
specication and dierent maturities shows patterns identical to the one lag case.
The scal adjustment beta for the debt valuation channel more than doubles from
-0.27 at the 1-year maturity to -0.64 at the 20-year maturity. This translates
into 7.16% and 16.76% scal risk absorbed by 1-year debt and 20-year debt,
respectively. For VAR(2), we have also estimated the betas using only innovations
to future returns and conrmed that long-term debt, mainly through adjustments
to future returns, provides signicantly better scal insurance relative to short-
term debt.
A. Actual maturity structure of government debt
The right panel of Table 12 shows that the fraction of scal adjustment provided
by value weighted returns, 9.40%, falls between the fraction of scal risk absorbed
by 1-year bonds, 7.49% and 5-year bonds, 10.82%. This suggests that the value
weighted maturity of U.S. government debt over the sample period is somewhere
between 1 and 5 years. Figure 4 displays the face value weighted and market
value weighted maturity structure of U.S. government debt between 1939.I and
2008.III. Both maturity series 
uctuate substantially at low frequencies. At the
end of the WWII, the value weighted maturity was around eight years, declining
to less than two years by the mid-seventies. The face value weighted maturity
shows a similar pattern, rising above 8.5 years after WWII and declining to 2.5
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eighties and stay close to or above three years for the value weighted and above
four years for the face value weighted maturity until the end of the sample. Since
we use value weighted returns to quantify the debt valuation channel, we focus
on the market value weighted maturity. As anticipated, the average value of this
series for our regression sample period, between 1946.I and 2008.III, is 3.1 years.
This average, combined with the maturity by maturity scal insurance results in
Table 12, is consistent with our results for the debt valuation channel.


















Figure 4. Maturity Structure of Publicly Held Debt
Note: This plot shows the face value weighted and market value weighted maturity (in years) of publicly
held debt between 1939.I-2008.III. The vertical dotted line marks 1946.I, the beginning of the sample
period for our empirical analysis.
In a related paper, Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008) investigate the role of
debt management in providing scal insurance. They assess the quality of debt
management in OECD countries for the sample period 1970 to 2000. The authors
perform a cross-country regression of their scal insurance measure on debt com-
position and nd that the degree of scal insurance achieved is not well connected
to cross-country variations in debt issuance patterns. We, on the other hand, are
able to show empirically that long-term debt is more eective at absorbing s-
cal risk than short-term debt. There are multiple key dierences between our
approach and theirs. First, Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008) quantify scal in-
surance by the negative covariance between decit shocks and the current market34 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
value of debt, whereas we measure scal insurance by estimating scal adjustment
betas and mapping them into the fraction of scal risk absorbed by current and
future return variations. This allows us to use time series data more eectively
by including not only the current response of returns, but also the response of
future returns to scal shocks. Second, the authors approximate the market value
of debt from average coupon and maturity numbers whereas we unbundle, price
and rebundle every outstanding bond to construct this value, preserving not only
the volatility of the market value of debt, but more importantly the volatility of
holding returns at each maturity. These dierences in volatility across maturities
are central to our results that link debt maturity to the amount of scal insurance.
Finally, our sample period extends further back to 1946.
V. Conclusion
The U.S. government's nances, especially in times of high spending such as
wars, have been and continue to be a topic of importance for researchers, policy-
makers and the tax-paying public. There is, however, limited empirical work on
quantifying the adjustment channels that help stabilize the government's balances
following scal shocks. Our main contribution is to develop a novel framework
that links innovations to government spending to innovations to debt returns and
innovations to surpluses, and provides a direct measure of scal insurance. This
framework does not rely on any particular scal model, nor does it require taking
a stance on asset market completeness or government preferences. We make use
of the government's intertemporal budget constraint only, a common feature of
all dynamic scal models. We show that our log-linearized version of the govern-
ment's intertemporal budget constraint implies the following. Surprise defense
spending needs must be nanced either through surprise increases in primary
non-defense surpluses or through a surprise decline in current and future bond
returns. Our estimates show that in the postwar era, the U.S. government has
nanced at least 70% of its surprise defense spending needs by running primary
non-defense surpluses and about 9% by delivering real capital losses to bond hold-
ers. The latter result indicates that the U.S. government was able to achieve a
limited, but non-negligible degree of scal insurance through bond markets.
Our second contribution is a novel VAR specication that estimates scal shocks
more precisely and helps resolve the \timing" issue associated with using only
aggregate data to identify these shocks. In this novel specication, we include
returns on defense stocks as an additional explanatory variable. Defense stock
returns respond contemporaneously to news about defense spending growth and
hence predict future defense spending growth. Our approach has already been
adopted by Jonas D. M. Fisher and Ryan H. Peters (2010), who use similar defense
stock variables in their VAR to identify government spending shocks and estimate
the response of consumption, real wages, hours and other real macroeconomic
variables to such shocks. Our emphasis is on scal adjustment channels. The
augmented VAR speci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has made some use of bond markets to nance its surprise defense spending needs
in the postwar era. About 9% of scal shocks were absorbed by a drop in current
and future returns.
Our third contribution concerns the link between debt maturity and the degree
of scal insurance. We provide empirical evidence that long-term debt, mainly
through adjustment to future returns, is a better instrument for absorbing s-
cal risk compared to short-term debt. We show that the fraction of scal risk
absorbed by debt of 1-year maturity is over 7%, whereas this fraction is more
than double of that amount at about 17% for debt of 20-year maturity. These
results have important implications for models concerning active management of
government debt. Specically, the eectiveness of long-term debt in absorbing
scal shocks may help mitigate concerns about the costs of using such debt.
Our analysis separates the responses of bond returns from the response of sur-
pluses to defense spending shocks. We then pursue a further decomposition and
estimate the contributions of the responses of non-defense spending and receipts
to scal shocks. Depending on the particular VAR lag specication, the results
indicate that 33% to 38% of scal risk is absorbed by a decrease in non-defense
spending growth, and between 39% and 69% by an increase in receipt growth.
The implications of these dierent channels of government nancing on the rest
of the economy, especially on output, consumption, employment and investment,
can be quite dierent depending on the economic environment assumed. We leave
the investigation of this to future research.
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Appendix A: Log-linearization of the Government Budget Constraint
We start with the dynamic budget constraint of the government. All variables
are expressed in real terms. Let Bt denotes the time-t real market value of govern-
ment debt outstanding at the beginning of the period. The government budget
constraint is given by:
Bt+1 = Rb
t+1 (Bt   St);
where Rb
t+1 is the gross real return on government debt between t and t+1. The
government's real primary surplus, St = Tt   Gt, is computed as the dierence
between receipts Tt and expenditures Gt. Tt also includes seignorage revenue.
The growth rate of government debt can be stated simply as the gross return











We assume that Bt > 0 and Bt > St, for all t. Additionally, we assume that
the log receipts to debt ratio, log(Tt=Bt), and the log spending to debt ratio,38 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
log(Gt=Bt), are stationary around their respective average values b and gb, and
that exp(b) exp(gb) is between 0 and 1. Using lower case letters to denote logs,




t+1 + log(1   exp(st   bt)); if St > 0
rb
t+1 + log(1 + exp(dt   bt)); if Dt =  St > 0;
where we distinguish between the case in which the government is running sur-
pluses and the case in which it is running decits. If the government only ran
surpluses, then we could expand the right-hand side of the log budget constraint
as a function of st   bt around sb = logSB:




(st   bt)   sb

:
Since governments do run decits, an alternative expansion is required. We



































where K absorbs unimportant constants. The weights are dened as sb = b  
gb, with b = exp(b) and gb = exp(gb):









where  = 1   sb: Rearranging terms produces:
nst   bt = rb
t+1   nst+1 + (nst+1   bt+1):
This is a rst-order dierence equation that can be solved by repeated substitution
for the weighted log surplus to debt ratio. Taking conditional expectations andVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCING FISCAL SHOCKS 39
imposing the tail condition limj!1 Etj(nst+j   bt+j) = 0, we obtain:





















t+1 for bt+1   Etbt+1 yields:








Appendix B: Fiscal Data
The source for most of our scal budget data is NIPA Table 3.2, Government
Current Receipts and Expenditures, seasonally adjusted and measured in billions
of dollars. Government expenditures G include current expenditures (Line 41),
gross government investment (Line 42), and capital transfer payments (Line 43).
We subtract consumption of xed capital (Line 45) and debt interest payments
(Line 29) from current expenditures. We separate total government expenditure
into two components: defense spending, Gdef and non-defense spending, Gndef.
National defense spending data are from NIPA Table 3.9.5., Line 11 (national
defense expenditures). They are seasonally adjusted and measured in billions of
dollars. We adjust Gdef by subtracting the proportion of consumption of xed
capital that's attributable to defense spending (as a percentage of total spending).
We compute Gndef by subtracting Gdef from total expenditures G.
We calculate government receipts, T, by taking total receipts (Line 37 of NIPA
Table 3.2), which includes current tax receipts, contributions for social insur-
ance, income receipts on other assets and current transfer receipts, and adding
on seignorage revenue. We compute seignorage revenue at time t as (Mt  
Mt 1)=CPIt, where Mt is the monetary base at time t and CPIt is the price
level dened by the consumer price index at t. Therefore real seignorage revenue
includes the \in
ation tax", the resources generated from adjusting the real value
of the existing monetary base, and the real value of revenues from a change in the
monetary base. The monetary base data are the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary
Base (AMBSL) series, seasonally adjusted and measured in billions of dollars.